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Abstract 
This paper intends to contribute to the on-going debate about whether and how agricultural market 
restructurings can provide viable opportunities for small-scale farmers in Africa. It aims at analyzing 
contract farming from the smallholders’ perspective and at understanding the implications regarding 
contractual arrangements with processing agribusinesses and/or export firms. Using an original approach 
that allows linking farm level analysis to territorial and value-chains levels analysis, the research intends 
to better understanding the complex and multidimensional implications of agricultural structural change. 
Based on case-studies from the citrus sector in South Africa, the paper argues that contract farming is not 
a panacea for smallholders. On one hand, contract farming can improve production for farmers; it can 
also enable better access to services and resources and create real opportunities for smallholders to 
participate in modern markets. However, on the other hand, the investigation shows that contract farming 
remains limited both at territorial and value-chain levels: it, mostly involves the already better-off and the 
larger-scale farmers who have benefited, among others, from significant public support. Moreover, when 
contract farming includes a handful of smallholders, it can lead to a loss of control and decision rights 
over production and resources. Overcoming these challenges is essential. The latter will need to be 
complemented by other measures allowing not only the integration of smallholders into the global 
economy, but the broader agricultural transformations and structural change.  
Introduction 
South Africa is characterized by a highly unequal farming sector, an apartheid ‘legacy’ which excluded 
black farmers from resources, market-oriented agriculture, and mainstream food markets. In that context, 
restructuring agriculture represents not only a decisive element of the ideological transition, but is also 
seen as one of the conditions of socio-political stabilization.  
From the early 1990s onwards, the end of apartheid and related liberalization offered hopes to overcome 
the duality of agriculture. The production environment has changed (economic deregulation and 
withdrawal of the state) and markets have been restructured, becoming increasingly consumer-driven and 
vertically integrated (Weatherspoon & Reardon, 2003; Sautier et al., 2006). In this context, contract 
farming1 (CF hereafter) has been considered a powerful tool to integrate (black) smallholders in the 
mainstream agricultural economy (Sartorius, 2004; World Bank, 2007; Fréguin-Gresh & Anseeuw, 2011), 
in particular as much of the post-liberalization literature and developers sees CF as a private-led 
arrangement capable to reduce the transaction costs and risks of smallholders’ (World Bank, 2007).. 
                                                     
1 Contract farming is generally a form of vertical integration between agricultural producers and buyers (exporters, agro-processing 
companies or retailers at the end of the value chain). The definition used by Little and Watts (1994) is very comprehensive: ‘forms of 
vertical coordination between growers and buyers-processors that directly shape production decisions through contractually 
specifying market obligations (by volume, value, quality, and, at times, advanced price determination); provide specific inputs; and 
exercise some control at the point of production (i.e. a division of management functions between contractor and contractee’. Thus, 
in South Africa like in other developing countries, CF is today one of the most debated institutional arrangements for production and 
marketing of agricultural commodities. 
The objective of the paper is to contribute to the debate on prospects of CF for South African 
smallholders. It will focus on whether or not contracts can successfully help black smallholders to improve 
market access, and therefore contribute to the country’s agricultural transformation. The paper is based 
on insights from the citrus sector, a value-chain characterized by significant restructurings and the recent 
emergence of CF opportunities for smallholders. Two case studies from the South African citrus sector 
are presented: the first one refers to a contract linking a private exporter with land reform beneficiaries; 
the second one focuses on a leading juice processor engaged in a contract with a smallholders’ 
organization. A case-study approach was applied as the analyzed linkages are the result of recent 
initiatives and do not represent an overall and common trend. However, they illustrate the nature of these 
relationships, both for export and domestic markets and appear as pioneer initiatives that are given much 
attention from both the private and the public sectors. Also, contracts do vary. Detailing these case-
studies allows thus to cover the existing diversity, before endeavoring to point out common factors related 
to the citrus sector in particular, or to the agricultural sector in general. 
A first section of this paper will present an overview of the implications of South Africa’s macro-economic 
restructurings and transformations on the citrus sector. A second section will analyze the effectiveness of 
CF and discuss the factors that affect the likelihood of the establishment and sustainability of these 
contracts for smallholders in South Africa. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are presented in the 
third section. 
 
The South African citrus sector: from public regulation to private standardization of a dual, 
liberalized, export-oriented sector 
Over the past decades, major evolutions occurred in the production and trade governance patterns within 
the agricultural and citrus sectors in South Africa. Three factors should be mentioned: the liberalization 
and deregulation of agriculture; the development of a governance environment shaped by private norms 
and standards; and the emergence of large oligopolistic actors dominating both production and trade. 
First, as most economic sectors in South Africa, the citrus sector was well organized and strongly 
regulated by the state until the 1970s. Related to domestic political forces enhanced by pressures 
emerging from the GATT negotiations (Vink & Kirsten, 2000) the agricultural sector, among which the 
citrus sector, faced increasing deregulation and liberalization pressures, including a reduction in the use 
of price controls and registration requirements as instruments of trade policy; shifts from cost-plus pricing 
procedures towards more market-based pricing systems; and the dismantling of the marketing boards 
and parastatals. Control measures used for local citrus marketing ceased, export controls were cancelled 
and the board changed its status to that of a private company. At the end of 1995, anyone could register 
as a citrus export agent. 
Second, in parallel –or as a response- to liberalization, deregulation, and specific global developments 
linked to new food demand patterns, quality standards, referring to technical, safety, sanitary, 
environmental, and other social considerations, have become almost mandatory since the 1980s 
(Vermeulen et al., 2006; Jaffee, 2011). The ability to adequately address them determines the level of 
market access of farmer (Maertens & Swinnen, 2009; Maertens et al., 2011). According to the markets 
traded on, terms of requirements for quality, volumes, practices, and accreditation, differi. The national 
safety regulation provides stipulations relating to the grading, packing, and marking of citrus. In addition to 
the domestic ones, the export sector faces safety standards applied in many Northern countries, in 
particular Europe, which is the main importer of South African citrus. Standards such as Hazard Analysis 
Critical Control Points, International Food Safety, Good Agricultural Practices (Eurep/GlobalGAP), British 
Retail Consortium, Safe Quality Food, organic labels, and private voluntary standards to ensure social 
accountability (SA8000, Nature’s Choice, Fair-Trade, etc.) are applied to production and all along the 
value-chain up to the point where the fruits leave the farm (Jooste et al., 2007). 
Third, on contrary to what one could have expected of the end of apartheid, these restructurings 
entrenched the concentration at both upstream and downstream levels, as it occurred in other countries 
(Reardon & Timmer, 2007; Bijman, 2008; Prowse & Thirion, 2012). On one hand, regarding the upstream 
segment, production remains dualistic: around 1,400 to large-scale (ranging from 0.5ha to 500ha) export-
oriented growers (mostly white) control over 80% of volumes, while a further 2,200 smallholders (mostly 
blacks), with each having on average less than 100 trees, produce for local markets (Philp, 2006). Even if 
land reform can be expected to change ownership patterns, implementation remains slow (5% of the area 
in 15 years) and often unsuccessful (90% of redistributed farms collapse) (Anseeuw & Mathebula, 2008). 
On the other hand, the downstream segment is characterized by the development of oligopolistic 
structures which organized itself around a small number of processors, packing-houses, and exporters 
(Figure 1). Two consequences are directly related to the latter. Firstly, except the informal market which 
tolerates small, irregular volumes, and variable quality, all other channels are submitted to standards, 
developed by these private agribusinesses trying to facilitate the adoption of their own specifications. 
Secondly, in order to reduce their transaction costs and to reduce price fluctuations, the latter chose to 
work with few preferred suppliers able to provide adequate and reliable volumes and qualities at specific 
times (Louw et al., 2006). 
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Figure 1: Mapping of the structure of the South African Citrus production. Source: (Fréguin-Gresh & 
Anseeuw, 2012b) 
 
Questioning the effectiveness of contracts for small-scale citrus growers 
In theory, the restructured South African economy and markets should present opportunities for 
smallholders (Reardon et al., 2003; Reardon & Hopkins, 2006; Vorley et al., 2007). However, due to the 
evolutions of production and market structures, citrus growers face increasing competition and entry 
barriers, and have no choice but to comply with standards to access markets. In this context, the pros and 
cons of CF have to be analyzed. 
Enhancing Production Capacity – A necessity to reach modern markets 
In a context where high-value crops necessitate input levels and service provision exceeding the financial 
resources of small-scale growers and where the state withdrew from direct support, CF can play an 
important role in smallholders’ empowerment, access to resources, services, and capital (Minot, 1986; 
Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002a; Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002b; Bijman, 2008; Minot, 2009). As such, contracts 
can enable smallholders to access modern markets in several ways. 
Firstly, contracts can enable smallholders to access to quality seedlings and adequate inputs, enabling 
them to provide adequate varieties and quality fruits. The related costs being deducted from the final 
payment, contracts enable them to access the right inputs at the right moment and, thus, to follow the 
stipulations required by the standards and certification procedures. Secondly, contracts can also help 
smallholders to access funds for standardization thanks to direct provision of loans by the agribusinesses 
or to the agribusinesses’ guarantees to banks. Thirdly, they can provide smallholders with quality 
services. In most contracts, quality and often free of charge technical assistance is provided by 
agribusinesses enabling farmers to address production issues and, in some cases, to deal with project 
management aspects (financial management, administration). Contracts involve thus capacity building 
and skills transfers. Thanks to the combination of these, contracts can enable smallholders to produce in 
quantity and in quality, to consistently supply their contractors, according to the requirements, providing 
the tools for the production to reach markets. 
Consequently, contracts can be considered as value-adding instruments in a context of lack or 
insufficiency of public supports, a constraint clearly faced by smallholders. As such, contracts allow 
farmers to be empowered, as they were not able by their own means to succeed in reaching standards 
and in producing enough volumes without (agribusinesses’) support. 
Post-harvest support - Enabling to Compete with Large Growers 
Besides the empowerment at production level, contracts do directly facilitate market access (Kirsten & 
Sartorius, 2002a; Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002b; Louw et al., 2006; Fréguin-Gresh & Anseeuw, 2012a). The 
latter is of particular importance in South Africa, where market access represented a tool of the 
apartheid’s segregation policies. However, in addition to the emergence of standards, markets’ 
restructurings kept the large majority of the doors closed to new entrants (Maertens al a. 2009; 2011; 
Jaffee 2011): in many cases, the privatization process of public entities such as parastatals and boards 
resulted in well established enterprises controlling the oligopolistic downstream sectors (Anseeuw 2004). 
As such, contracts facilitate guaranteed direct access to output markets that traditionally are controlled by 
a few dominating stakeholders. 
In addition, as agribusinesses have a superior ability in terms of post-harvest handling, infrastructures, 
storage, and transportation access and management, contracts enable smallholders to achieve the 
complex logistics issues with regards to transportation from the fields to the packing-houses and/or 
processing units, and to the harbor or the airports when the products are exported. Although smallholders 
often deliver citrus to the certified packing-houses by their own means, exporters use specialized 
transportation to transfer the packaged fruits to the harbor or airports, helping to preserve high quality and 
to ensure traceability of fruits. One can note that labeling and traceability requirements, two major 
concerns in modern markets, are often organized by the agribusinesses. This situation largely explains 
exporters’ strict control over post-harvest handling and transportation procedures. The final shipment to 
international markets is arranged by exporters which are also the only ones licensed for exportation by 
national authorities.  
Transferring Decision-rights over Production and Resources 
Because of the aforementioned positive impacts, contracts have been widely promoted as a means of 
maintaining high productivity for smallholders. In the South African citrus sector, they are promoted as 
‘strategic partnerships’ representing a tripartite alliance between smallholders, an agribusiness, with 
government being mediator and (partial) fund providerii. This is particularly the case when smallholders 
benefit from land reform programmes (Derman et al., 2006). 
These ‘partnerships’ rely on the cost- and productivity-effectiveness in managing, producing, harvesting, 
collecting, and trading the produce of a single large unit. It also allows agribusinesses to adopt new types 
of certifications, such as Fair Trade, even if the relevance and the redistribution effects of this social 
certification can be questioned. 
However, in many cases, the certification and decision-rights’ transfers offer agribusinesses a lucrative 
opportunity to expand their activities, to access resources and manage the production at farm level, 
directly or indirectly, on behalf of smallholders. It results in the agribusinesses having major control over 
production with the contract shifting most decision-rights and risks to them. In many cases, smallholders 
do not control anymore production or any stage of the decision process, and find themselves incorporated 
within production chains, in which they represent only an isolated element and on which they have no 
orientation power. Generally, the technical capital used does not belong to them, but is made available by 
the management company, subordinating the farmers’ position and developing a dependency situation, 
since smallholders become unable to withdraw from these relations without losing access to the 
necessary finances and inputs. The transfer of autonomous family farms into entrepreneurial structures 
necessarily modifies the relations with the agricultural activity per se (Anseeuw et al., 2011): the farmers 
become rent-seekers or service-providers for the agribusinesses. As previously stated by (Barrett & 
Mutambatsere, 2005; Reardon & Huang, 2008; Barrett et al., 2012), from a mainstream economics 
tradition, this situation points out that ‘[CF] typically displaces decision-making authority from the farmer to 
the downstream processor or distributor, turning farmers into quasi-employees’. In other analytical terms, 
this situation is equivalent to a form of ‘proletarianization’ of small farmers without dispossession (De 
Schutter, 2011; Borras & Franco, 2012). 
This situation highlights the need to interrogate the expectations, interests and motivations of the actors 
involved, and to question the sustainability of contracts, economically, politically and socially. 
Concerning only a few, often already better established farmers 
It is important to mention that CF only concerns a small proportion of farmers, especially when 
smallholders are considered. This observation drastically questions contracts as a broad-based tool for 
market integration and – particularly in South Africa - for agricultural restructuring. 
Quantifying the scale of contract agriculture, whatever the level of analysis, is extremely difficult. Whereas 
most studies in this respect focus on its impact at farm level, only a few attempt to estimate the scope of 
its development in Africa (Grosh, 1994; Little & Watts, 1994). In South Africa, Vermeulen et al.  
(Vermeulen et al., 2008) estimate that almost 80% of the volumes of fruits and vegetables transformed by 
the processing industry (21% of the national volumes) and between 70% and 100% of the products sold 
in supermarkets were supplied under contract, of which only 5% involved smallholders. Indeed, in South 
Africa like in other countries, “the crop and commodity-specificity of much of the available data, and the 
resulting lack of systematic empirical information, make it impossible to assess the precise quantitative 
significance of production in CF schemes [and in particular smallholders’ ones], across the full range of 
contracted crops, and especially over time” (Oya, 2011). 
 
Table 1: extent of Contracts in South Africa for selected commodities. Sources: authors’ compilation 
Sub-sector # of contract farmers # of contract smallholders 
Sugar cane 16 045  14 445 
Timber 50 000 15 000 
Cotton 3 000 - 
Fresh Fruits and Vegetables 3 430 278 
 
Compared to the estimated 40 000 commercial farm units and 1.2 million small-scale farms (Department 
of Agriculture, 2001), the number of South African contracted farmers remains low (less than 1.2% of the 
total number of farm households in the region). This is confirmed by other studies, among which one 
implemented in a dynamic agricultural region of Limpopo (Fréguin-Gresh et al., 2012), showing that only 
a few farmers are engaged in at least one contract, whether verbal or formal, out of whose very few were 
smallholders, as shown in Table 2. The effectiveness of contracts in terms of inclusiveness can thus be 
questioned. 
 Table 2: Buyers, contracts, and types of households in the Tzaneen region, Limpopo, South Africa. 
Sources: (Fréguin-Gresh et al., 2011) 
 Types of buyers % each type of farming system having at least one  contract Types of contracts 
Micro-farmers  No sale 0% No contract 
Subsistence small-
scale  
No sale 
0% No contract 
Spot markets 
Small-scale producers  
Spot markets 
0% No contract 
Local merchants 
Medium-scale 
producers  
Local merchants 
57% 
No contract 
Fresh Produce markets 
(FPM) No contract 
Restaurants Informal marketing agreements 
Supermarkets No contract or formal organic production-management contracts  
Processors Informal marketing agreements or formal production-management contracts  
Emerging farmers 
Local merchants 
100% 
No contract or informal agreements 
Road-side stalls Informal marketing agreements 
FPM No contract or informal marketing agreements 
Supermarkets Formal organic production-management contracts 
Processors Informal agreements or formal production-management contracts  
Extensive commercial 
farmers 
Local merchants 
27% 
No contract 
FPM  No contract or informal marketing agreements 
Processors Informal gentlemen agreements 
Exporting agents Formal market-specification contracts  
Intensive commercial 
farmers 
Local merchants 
50% 
No contract or informal gentlemen agreements 
FPM No contract or informal gentlemen marketing agreements 
Processors Informal agreements or formal marketing or production-management contracts 
Exporting agents Marketing contracts 
 
Factors affecting the likelihood of establishing and sustaining contracts 
Literature details internal factors related to the product characteristics and processing influencing the 
establishment and sustainability of contracts. The factors regard the product (characteristics, market 
trade-on, nature and need of processing) and the farmers’ and agribusinesses’ characteristics (asset 
specificities, uncertainty, performance in fulfilling the terms of an agreed transaction, need for 
coordination with other transactions with other actors) (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001). However, external 
factors do also play a significant role in establishing and sustaining contracts. 
Public Incentives 
Although the role of the state has officially decreased in South Africa, public action is still strongly 
engaged in the agricultural sector, and in the linkages between smallholders and agribusinesses in 
particular. While poverty remains highly concentrated, both socio-economically and geographically, 
government implements various policy frameworks supporting small-scale (black) agricultureiii. The role 
played by public bodies during the establishment and implementation phases of contracts is significant in 
number of support programmes and in importance. 
Government intervenes directly in the provision of production factors, mainly during the establishment of 
previously disadvantaged farmers. This is particularly true in the citrus sector where a great majority of 
the small-scale farms results from land reform: 21% of small-scale citrus farms are on redistributed or 
restituted state land, 18% are on an equity shares or joint-venture models, 12% are owned by the Land 
Bank, and only 3% are on private free-hold tenure (Citrus Growers Association, 2010). Smallholders can 
also access public funding through micro-finance programmesiv. In addition, they benefit from capacity 
building from various public programmes aiming at strengthening compliance to safety regulations. These 
supports fulfill government’s socio-political objectives to promote the previously disadvantaged farmers, 
even though the system is often riddled with recurrent failures. 
Agribusinesses do also benefit from public incentives. The most prominent incentive is related to the 
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment for agriculture (AgriBEE), an affirmative action policy. Based 
on a scorecard, businesses classified as BEE benefit from subsidies and government contracts (van 
Rooyen et al., 2010). One AgriBEE recognized activityv is the procurement from black farmers (as 
contracting small-scale black farmers is potentially risky), within the broader engagement of the 
agribusiness in rural development. As seen in the citrus case-study, it is clear that AgriBEE’s incentives 
represent an important –even the major- reason for agribusinesses to contract smallholders (see Figure 
2). 
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Figure 2: The current institutional environment of Contract Agriculture in South Africa. Source: Fréguin-
Gresh and Anseeuw 2011 
 
The State also intervenes significantly in various dimensions besides the afore-mentioned direct supports: 
it can initiate the contacts between the partners by bringing in the agribusiness, engage in the negotiation, 
establishment and monitoring of contracts in different degrees and forms. It also intervenes as mediator 
during conflicts or contract breeches. 
Agrarian Structures 
Besides the agro-ecological and technical aspects related to the production and marketing facets, South 
Africa’s ‘legacy’ in terms of past policies, level of public incentives, and concentration of assets, 
influencing institutional, political, and socioeconomic factors related to its rural transformation (Perret et 
al., 2005 ). The permanence of duality of South African agriculture has strongly and deeply influenced 
farmers’ development paths and remains determinant in the ability of farmers to respond to markets’ 
requirements and their possibility to engage into contracts. The differences in scale of production and 
trade imply competition discrepancies between farmers, negatively affecting the smaller (black) ones. 
These divergences in production scale and trade lead to biased power relations, resulting in 
disadvantaged bargaining positions for smallholders. Analyzing the agrarian structure –i.e. farming 
practices, asset endowment, and farmers’ development paths- are essential to understand the modalities, 
opportunities and limitations of the South African agricultural sector and of contracts as a tool to address 
these situations. 
Collective Action 
Often related to the capacity of farmers to establish networks, collective action is essential. Farmer's 
organizations facilitate the implementation and the sustainability of contracts (Runsten & Key, 1996). As 
mentioned by Sartorius (2004), farmers’ organizations are beneficial to farm products’ trade and 
agribusinesses’ development. Farmers as individuals are at the weak-end of the economic exchange 
system, and therefore have to evolve strategies to enhance their market power. Agribusinesses can deal 
more efficiently with organizations by acquiring representation in the management structure, as well as, 
allowing the organization to be represented in its own management structure. However, agribusinesses 
often emphasize the difficulties related to dealing with farmers’ organizations and prefer individual, 
agribusiness-to-farmer procurement routes. As shown in the citrus sector case-study, such practices limit 
the possibilities for smallholders as they will never be able to attain the required thresholds. Farmer's 
organizations should be responsible for configuring its members with market requirements including 
training, extension, technology acquisition, input provision and co-coordinating harvesting-delivery 
schedules. The agribusinesses, moreover, can further influence the efficiency of the organization by 
ensuring it maintains records, has no political agenda, is limited in size and that it contains sufficient 
professional management. 
According to one particular more advanced model, smallholders are “empowered” as shareholders and 
participate (although partly) in governance and executive control of the firms. Consequently, directly 
engaged in the decision-making processes related to the processing and trade of citrus, it overcomes the 
afore-mentioned issues related to collective action and also transforms their position from ‘market users’ 
to ‘market makers’. Support regarding collective action and renewed business models is thus crucial. 
Multi-stakeholder Initiatives 
Institutional facilitation by international NGOs, donors, and other stakeholders, can assist in establishing 
linkages between small farmers and agribusinesses. Although such type of engagements is not 
extensively developed in South Africa, they do appear in particular related to export markets. This is the 
case with the Fair-Trade certification, engaging numerous land-reform citrus projects in South Africa 
(Ikegami, 2008). Although the genuinity of such certifications is sometimes questioned (Fouilleux, 2011), 
engaged producers can be represented and supported on issues such as delivering technical support, 
campaigning for new prices, revision of existing standards or making the standards more relevant to local 
practices. These initiatives provide an effective platform to coordinate and communicate among certified 
producers. 
Some concluding thoughts 
The objective of this paper was to analyze patterns, effectiveness, and external factors of contracts 
linking smallholders and agribusinesses in the South African citrus sector. The results show that although 
contracts can be positive in terms of empowerment, access to resources, services, capital and markets, 
they also emphasize that CF per se is not a panacea, particularly for the smaller farmers. 
Certain concerns occur. The results emphasize that smallholders remain overall excluded and do not 
benefit from contracts as a tool to facilitate their integration into input and output markets. Although 
significant changes have occurred in South African agriculture, the many entry barriers linked to South 
Africa’s restructured and modernized markets (leading to a renewed regulatory framework mainly through 
private norms and standards) results in the continued exclusion and marginalization of smallholders with 
limited access to assets, relying mainly on diversified incomes to sustain their livelihoods. As shown by 
some authors (Losch et al., 2011; Oya, 2011; Barrett et al., 2012), the inclusiveness of contracts remains 
thus very limited. Secondly, those who manage to integrate contractual arrangements are generally 
affected by concerns of transfer of control and decision-rights over production and resources to 
agribusinesses. The case-studies described not only stress the often-mentioned biased power and 
negotiations relations between the different partners; they also show that – due to the agribusinesses’ 
oligopolistic position - the smallholders lose control over their resource and production base. These 
aspects are particularly relevant to South Africa: The country’s legacy leads to a dual agricultural sector 
with biased inter-farmer competition, unequal agribusiness-(small) farmer relationships and, subsequent, 
non-inclusiveness or unsustainable contracts. 
In order to overcome these issues, Government is intervening directly (making available production 
factors, capacity building and empowerment programmes, etc.) or indirectly through the promotion of 
smallholder relationships with well-established large-scale farmers and agribusinesses. The only 
smallholder (citrus) farmers engaged in contracts (and the related agribusinesses) had indeed benefited 
from significant support measures and (financial) incentives. Several questions remain. It seems that 
these benefits are the primordial (only?) incentives for agribusinesses to engage in longer term 
perspectives with smallholders, interrogating the genuinity of CF as a tool for smallholders. Also, the 
financial sustainability of such a development model is yet to be considered and the ability to replicate it 
elsewhere is certainly to be questioned. Lastly, it also questions the core essence of CF, i.e. delivering 
services for (smallholder) farmers in a context of deregulation and state withdrawal. The state is indeed 
still present and needed in the support of agriculture, particularly regarding smallholders. 
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i To access the export markets, exporters have to be registered and to comply with the South African Export Regulations which 
determine the deliverance of an export certificate when in compliance. 
ii Although the model occurs commonly all over South Africa, it has been promoted under an official programme, entitled the 
‘Strategic Partnership Programme’ in Limpopo. 
iii The White Paper on Agriculture (1995), BATAT (1995), the Strauss Commission Report of inquiry into the provision of Rural 
Financial Services (1996), and the Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture (2001) all explicitly grapple with the challenges 
agricultural support generally and post-settlement support in particular and refer to the need for enabling conditions for the emerging 
farmers/land reform beneficiaries. This culminated in 2004 with the announcement by the Minister of Agriculture that a provision of 
R210 million had been made for the initial rollout of the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) 
iv For e.g., the CASP that provides grants for infrastructural development during the settlement phase 
v Other components are black ownership, management and control within the agribusiness, employment equity, skills development, 
and corporate social investment. 
